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The Quadrennial Defense Review 1997 recommended reductions of civilian and
military personnel associated with infrastructure. The Naval Reserve Force is
aggressively pursuing options to reduce excess infrastructure within the Navy. This
thesis examines one of Commander Naval Surface Reserve Force's initiatives for
reducing the current number of Operating Budget holder's Comptroller Departments
without sacrificing efficiency and effectiveness of operations. The central objective of
this research was to determine whether excess capacity existed in these Comptroller
Departments. To address this issue, interviews were conducted with key financial
personnel assigned to the Naval Reserve Force. Additionally, a questionnaire was
distributed to fifty percent (5 of 10) of the Comptrollers to obtain information on
manpower requirements, department operating procedures, and department task
requirements. The primary finding is that Naval Surface Reserve Force Operating
Budget holder's comptroller organizations could be reduced from ten to seven and
continue to operate efficiently and effectively. The analysis concluded that enough
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Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission 1995
recommended closures of two Readiness Commands and eight
Reserve Centers to reduce infrastructure and realize cost
savings within the Naval Reserve. Closures were completed
in 1996 leaving ten operational Readiness Commands (OB
holders) . The Quadrennial Defense Review, which was
completed in May 1997, recommended that all services reduce
infrastructure further to produce cost savings. The QDR
found that DoD has enough excess base structure to warrant
two additional rounds of BRAC similar in scale to those of
1995.
Now that the cold war is over, the Naval Reserve finds
itself in a conflict that poses a real threat to its ability
to respond effectively if called upon. It is a budget war
and the conflict is being waged within the Navy. It centers
on the distribution of Navy Department resources. Our Naval
Reserve forces must change dramatically in response to the
budget constrained environment and requirements to maintain
a level of readiness to support our active forces when
called upon. The Naval Reserve must be leaner and more
efficient in order to meet the demands of the budget. We
not only have the opportunity to change, we have the
requirement to change. Since DoD budgets are not likely to
increase, we in the Navy and Naval Reserve will have to do
more with less
.
The Navy is trying to determine how to allocate
resources between force structure and the infrastructure
needed to support those forces. As the force structure gets
smaller, the infrastructure to support it should decrease as
well. The objective of this research is to present
information that will assist our Naval Reserve leadership in
making informed decisions in reducing force structure and
its supporting infrastructure.
B . OBJECTIVES
This thesis will examine the potential cost savings
created by reducing the number of current Operating Budget
(OB) holders in the Naval Surface Reserve Force while
preserving efficiency and effectiveness of financial
operations. The thesis will focus only on those savings
generated through the comptroller/financial department.
Research will include conducting an analysis of functions
expressed by the Operating Budget holder's comptroller
organization. A review of prior, current and future
organizational structure; and a cost and benefit analysis of
reducing current Operating Budget holders.
My research efforts are confined to the Naval Surface
Reserve Force, but results from this research may assist the
chain of command in the decision making process in how to
efficiently and effectively restructure the Naval Reserve
during this period of downsizing.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
Primary Question
1. What is the best structure for Naval Surface Reserve
Force Operating Budget holders (comptroller organizations)





Can the number of Naval Surface Reserve Force
Operating Budget holders (comptroller organizations) be
reduced while preserving efficiency and effectiveness of
financial operations?
2. What is the cost savings of reducing Operating
Budget Holder's comptroller organizations?
3 What is the best way to consolidate Operating Budget
Holder's comptroller organizations?
4. How many Reserve Centers can an Operating Budget
Holder's comptroller organization manage efficiently and
effectively?
D. SCOPE
This thesis will investigate whether Naval Surface
Reserve Operating Budget Holder's comptroller organizations
can be reduced while preserving efficiency and effectiveness
of financial operations. The thesis will also evaluate the
potential savings created by reducing the number Operating
Budget Holder's comptroller organizations. Research will
include conducting an analysis of functions exercised by the
Operating Budget holder's comptroller organization. A review
of prior, current and recommended future organizational
structure to support such a change; and conducting a cost




Information will be collected primarily through
interviews with current Comptrollers of Naval Reserve
Readiness Commands (OB holders) . Additional interviews will
be conducted with personnel associated .with Naval Surface
Reserve Force and commands that routinely conduct financial
operations with the Operating Budget Holder's comptroller
organizations
.
Background data will be gathered through interviews of
Naval Surface Reserve Force personnel. Also, a literature
review will be conducted concurrently to include: DoD
reports, documents, instructions, and various other
publications
.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This thesis is divided into five chapters as follows:
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II will discuss
the reorganizing/restructuring, reduction of infrastructure,
process reengineering and other cost saving measures during
this period of downsizing. Chapter III will briefly discuss
the Naval Surface Reserve Force and the Naval Surface
Reserve Force Operating Budget holder's organizational
structure. A review of Readiness Command's comptroller
departments prior organizational structure and functions
exercised; and current organizational structure and
functions exercised. Chapter IV will discuss the thesis
research methodology. Chapter V will include a cost and
benefit analysis and a discussion of the feasibility of
reducing the number of OB holders in Naval Surface Reserve
force. The final chapter will include answers to the thesis
questions and a conclusion of the research findings and





This chapter will discuss the nature and magnitude of
the infrastructure problem facing the DoD and Navy. A
review was conducted on books, articles, audit reports, and
the Department of the Navy's FY 199 7 Budget to gather
insight regarding the current efforts to deal with the
challenges as they relate to installations. This chapter
will focus on DoD's, the Navy's, and COMNAVSURFRESFOR'
s
efforts in the areas of reorganizing/restructuring,
infrastructure reduction, process reengineering and other
cost saving measures during this period of downsizing.
Additionally, this chapter will discuss how COMNAVSURFRESFOR
is internally reviewing its' infrastructure to see where
savings can be generated.
A. INFRASTRUCTURE REDUCTION AND BRAC
1 . Background
Traditionally Navy policy has been to cut
infrastructure to a greater degree than force structure
(e.g., ships, submarines, and aircraft)
.
(Force 2001, pg. 24)
DoD infrastructure includes a diverse set of activities
carried out by an even more diverse set of organizations.
Foremost among them are installations for the operating
forces, training programs for military personnel, logistics
support, central personnel services, and headquarters
functions. (QDR, 1997, pg . VIII-1)
The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission was
conceived to assist in reducing excess infrastructure. Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission 1995 reviewed and
recommended closures of two Readiness Commands and eight
Reserve Centers to reduce infrastructure and realize cost
savings within the Naval Reserve. Closures were completed
in 1996 leaving ten operational Readiness Commands (OB
holders) .
The mission of Readiness Commands (REDCOMs) is to
provide senior management support to Navy and Marine Corps,
Naval Reserve, and Naval Reserve Readiness Centers, Naval
Reserve Facilities, and Naval Activities at Joint Military
Armed Forces Reserve Centers. REDCOM missions and
responsibilities are further explained in chapter III.
BRAC- 95 concluded that there was significant excess
capacity at Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Centers. However,
the overriding concern was to maintain a demographically
sound Reserve establishment and guarantee Reserve recruiting
opportunities. "Demographically sound" refers to Reserve
Centers in every state for the Navy, or where they now exist
for the Marine Corps. This resulted in organization
closures only in areas with obvious duplication. The
Commission recommended retaining Reserve Centers in every
state for the Navy, or where they now exist for the Marine
Corps. Units were to be consolidated with active duty or
joint service centers where they could contribute more
directly to the fleet, without impacting recruiting
demographics. The downsizing of the Reserve establishment
allowed consolidation of the Navy Reserve Readiness Commands
by closing two REDCOMs while maintaining a geographically
appropriate structure
.
(BRAC, 1995, pg. E-8)
2. Justification for Closures
The BRAC- 95 Commission concluded that existing capacity
in support of the Reserve component continued to be in
excess of the force structure requirements for the year
2001. REDCOM 7 (Charleston, South Carolina) had management
responsibility for the fewest number of Reserve Centers of
the thirteen REDCOMs, while REDCOM 10 (New Orleans,
Louisiana) had management responsibility for the fewest
number of Selected Reservists. In 1994, nearly three-
fourths of the authorized SELRES billets at REDCOM 10 were
unfilled, suggesting a demographic shortfall. The declining
Reserve force structure necessitated more effective
utilization of resources and therefore justified closing of
these two REDCOMs. In arriving at the recommendation to
close these Reserve Commands, specific analysis was
conducted to ensure that there were either an alternate
location available to accommodate the affected Reserve
population or demographic support for force recruiting in
the areas to which units were being relocated.
The economic impact from closure of REDCOM 7 and REDCOM
10, assuming no economic recovery, resulted in a maximum
potential reduction of 42 military/civilian jobs (REDCOM 7).
and 73 military/civilian jobs (REDCOM 10) over the 1996-to-
2001 period. (BRAC, 1995, pg . E-13)
Despite the large reduction in infrastructure during
the 1995 round of base closures and realignment, the DoD and
the Navy continues to reduce excess capacity. The
Department of the Navy FY 199 7 Budget emphasizes a strong
commitment to increased efficiency in our infrastructure and
other resources. Within these priorities, the Department of
the Navy made modifications promoted by events that occurred
during the past year, such as specific actions approved for
BRAC IV. (Budget, 1997, pg. 1-1)
B. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (DON) FY 1997 BUDGET
1. DON Efficiency
The Department of the Navy is aggressively reducing the
cost of maintaining it's infrastructure. The fiscal year
1997 budget includes the funds necessary to implement base
realignments and closures mandated by BRAC II, III, and IV.
Additionally, appropriation estimates for FY 1997 include
specific costs and savings for BRAC IV. Savings resulting
from BRAC realignments and closures, when fully implemented,
10
are estimated to exceed $2 billion per year. As a result of
BRAC and other streamlining initiatives, industrial overhead
and supply operating costs at Working Capital Fund
activities will decline by more than $400 million between FY
1996 and FY 1997. BRAC and other efficiencies being
implemented by the Department of Navy will result in our
civilian personnel resources declining by almost 22,000
between FY 1995 and FY 1997 and by more than 46,000 by FY
2001. (Budget, 1997, pg . 4-6)
2. Military Personnel Naval Reserve
The fiscal year 1997 budget supports Naval Reserve end
strengths of 100,597; 98,894; and 95,941 in FY 1995, 1996
and FY 1997 respectively (Figure 2-1). The budget will
provide for extensive contributory support of the active
forces in addition to Navy roles and missions specifically
assigned to reserve units. Examples of contributory support
include active participation in worldwide contingencies,
intelligence support, fleet exercises/deployments,
counterdrug missions, and extensive medical support of
active forces. (Budget, 1997, pg. 2-14)
11

















Figure 2-1: Navy Manpower End Strengths
Figure 2.1: Navy Manpower End Strengths
3. Civilian Personnel
Civilian personnel have historically provided important
support to military combat forces in peacetime and in war.
Civilian personnel maintain military installations, repair
and maintain weapons systems, and provide logistical
support. In fiscal year 1997 about 648,000 of DoD's
civilian employees (81 percent) were projected to fill
positions that relate to infrastructure programs, while
150,000 (19 percent) were projected to fill positions
related to mission programs (Figure 2-2). (GAO audit report,
1997, pg. 29)
12
Operation and Maintenance Component: Civilian








Figure 2-2: Operation and Maintenance Component
Figure 2.2: Operation and Maintenance Component
The Navy budget includes civilian end strength of
230,580; 221,311; and 208,074 in FY 1995, 1996, and FY 1997
respectively (Figure 2.1). Civilian Personnel levels in
the Department are at the lowest level since before World
War II. The budget reflects the continued downward trend of
the civilian work force as a result of base closures,
reductions in force structure, and management efficiency.
(Budget, 1997, pg. 4-5)
Overall, the Navy budget for civilian personnel will
decline by over 22,000 end strength between FY 1995 and FY
1997 and by over 46,000 through FY 2001. A planned
13
reduction of almost 33,000 civilians through FY 2001 results
from BRAC II, III, and IV decisions. In addition to
infrastructure downsizing, civilian personnel levels in FY
1997-FY 2001 are reduced to reflect efficiencies and savings
as a result of the Department implementation of National-
Performance Review recommendations and re-engineering
processes which will improve the way we do business in the
future. (Budget, 1997, pg. 4-5)
The Navy is committed to infrastructure downsizing.
The next section will highlight those actions required to
further reduce infrastructure in DoD.
C. DOD RESTRUCTURING/REORGANIZATION
1. 21st Century Defense Infrastructure
The DoD infrastructure includes a diverse set of
activities carried out by an even more diverse set of
organizations. Foremost among them are installations for
the operating forces, training programs for military
personnel, logistics support, central personnel services,
and headquarters functions. The organizations that
performed these functions accounted for 48 percent of total
DoD employment (military and civilian) in FY 1997. (QDR,
1997, pg. VIII-3)
During the post -Cold War military drawdown, DoD
attempted to reduce the defense infrastructure, including
military bases and personnel associated with them, as it
14
reduced the force structure. However, infrastructure
reductions have lagged behind force structure reductions.
Specifically, from 1989 to 1997, the Department reduced
total active duty military end strength by 32 percent, a
figure that will grow to 36 percent by 2003 as a result of
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) . In comparison, even
after the completion of four rounds of base realignment and
closure (BRAC) , the world-wide base structure will have been
reduced only 26 percent. (QDR, 1997, pg . VIII-3)
However, civilian and military personnel employed in
infrastructure related activities have been reduced only 28
percent since 1989. The plans developed before the QDR were
projected to yield a total reduction to infrastructure
employment of 33 percent by 2003. To close the gap between
force structure and infrastructure reductions and begin to
reduce the share of the defense budget devoted to
infrastructure, the QDR recommended the following actions:
• Make a further reduction of 109,000 civilian and
military personnel associated with infrastructure
beyond the initiatives in the DoD budget for FY
1998. These further reductions will bring the total
reduction to infrastructure employment since 1989 to
39 percent.
• Request authority for two additional rounds of BRAC,
one in 1999 and the second in 2001.
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• Improve the efficiency and performance of DoD
support activities by adopting innovative management
and business practices of the private sector. These
include "reengineering" or "'reinventing" DoD support
functions, e.g., streamlining, reorganizing,"
downsizing, consolidating, and automating
operations. (QDR, 1997, pg. VIII-II)
2 . Reengineering the DoD Infrastructure
Most of DoD's infrastructure resides within the
military departments. This infrastructure, organized along
functional lines, furnishes resources for the management of
defense forces, facilities from which defense forces
operate, non-unit training, and personnel support. In FY
1997, military department infrastructure represents 78
percent of the Department ' s total infrastructure funding and
employs 572,000 civilian and 557,000 military personnel.
Before the QDR, the military departments had planned to
reduce infrastructure-related personnel by 58,000 civilian
and 20,000 military positions over the Future Year Defense
Plan (FYDP) , a total reduction of about 7 percent. By
streamlining management oversight, eliminating redundant
functions, and outsourcing or privatizing where appropriate,
the military departments are expected to reduce
infrastructure costs and personnel even further. Specific
proposals include:
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• Reduce logistics support costs by integrating
organizations and functions (supply, financial,
automated data processing, transportation,
maintenance, and procurement) now being performed at
multiple locations in a common geographic area.
Each military department will reduce inventories and
operating costs by sharing and linking consumer-
level inventories and by eliminating redundant
facilities and operations.
• Reduce layers of oversight at headquarters and
operational commands and eliminate management and
support positions no longer required because of
improvements in communications and information
technology. The Department will also consolidate
some support infrastructure outside the United
States. These actions will eliminate 10,000
military and 14,000 civilian positions. (QDR, 1997,
pg. VIII-III)
The QDR initiatives will reduce infrastructure
employment by about 109,000 (about 72,000 civilian and 37,000
military positions). As a result, by the end of FY 2003, QDR
initiatives plus those actions implied by the budget will
shrink total infrastructure employment to 1.2 million people,
which is 39 percent below 1989 level. (QDR, 1997, pg. VIII-IV)
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D. SUMMARY
A primary requirement of the U.S. military is fighting
and winning the nation's wars. To perform this role, the
Department requires robust and modern infrastructure.
Recent reductions will reduce the Department's
infrastructure to its historical proportion relative to the
size of the total force. Clearly further reductions are
possible, and must be made in order to support training,
modernization, and operational requirements at less cost.
DoD and the Department of the Navy are aggressively
pursuing options to reduce excess infrastructure. BRAC-95
examined and concluded that existing capacity in support of
the Reserve component continues to be in excess of the force
structure requirements for the year 2001. COMNAVSURFRESFOR
is pursuing alternative processes and procedures to ensure
all cost saving measures are reviewed and evaluated. One
COMNAVSURFRESFOR initiative includes reviewing the
feasibility of reducing the number Operating Budget holders
(Comptroller Departments) without sacrificing efficiency and
effectiveness. This initiative will be examined in the
following chapters.
18
III. NAVAL SURFACE RESERVE FORCE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The tradition of the Reserve Militia to serve the
nation goes back to the colonial days. The Navy Department
in 1887 prepared a plan of organization for the naval
militia force. By 1894, the movement had reached the point
where the Secretary of the Navy was given authority to lend
each state having a Naval Militia one of the Navy's older
ships, as well as equipment, to "promote drills and
instructions." By 1897, 16 states had a Naval Militia in
one form or another. By the time Theodore Roosevelt took
over as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the United States
Naval Militia had over 4,000 officer and enlisted personnel.
These militias came under the control of the Navy Department
with the Navy Militia Act of 1914.
On 13 March 1915, with World War I (WWI) progressing in
Europe, Congress passed legislation that first established a
Federal Naval Reserve to be composed of enlisted men who had
seen active service in the Navy. During WWI, about 30,000
reserve officers and 300,000 enlisted personnel served on
active duty in various roles in support of the war effort.
During the years following WWI and until the Japanese Navy
threat in 1938, the Naval Reserves suffered from a post war
force reduction and shortage of funds. World War II saw the
19
U.S. Navy grow to the largest in history. Four out of five
personnel in the Naval Forces were reservists. In the five
decades which have passed since 1945, the Naval Reserve has
continued to serve with distinction during times of crisis.
Today's Naval Reserve had it's genesis in 1946 with the
establishment of the Naval Air Reserve Training Command.
The Naval Air Reserve Training Command was established in
1946 at Glenview, Illinois. The Naval Reserve Training
Command (non- aviation) was established in 1956 at Omaha,
Nebraska. The Naval Reserve Training Command consisted of
surface, submarine and other non-aviation units. The
Commandants of what were then called Naval Districts were
responsible for the administration and training of these
Naval Reserve non-aviation units.
Each of these Naval Districts controlled a specific
Naval geographic region within which they supervised non-
aviation schedules. Even though the District of Commandant
was in control of non-aviation units, the District Deputy
Chief of Staff for Reserves had full authority for reserve
activities in that district. Prior to 1956, the District of
Commandants reported to the Director of the Naval
Reserve/Assistant Chief of Naval Operations Naval Reserves
(ACNO-NR) . After the reorganization in 1956, the Naval
Districts reported directly to the Chief of Naval Reserve
Training Command:
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Within the Naval Districts, numerous Naval Reserve
training centers provided drill space,
instruction, equipment, and administrative support
to drilling reservists. These training and
administrative support functions were usually
provided by a cadre of Naval Officers known as
Training and Administration for Reserves (TAR's).
(Murach, 1997, pg. 25)
The Reserve Centers (RESCENs) were commanded by a TAR
officer who reported to the District Deputy Chief of Staff
for Reserves. The Reserve Unit Commanding Officers (CO)
reported directly to the RESCEN Commanding Officer.
Initially, a Reserve unit was utilized to augment an active
duty ship during mobilization:
Since it was not always feasible for an entire
unit to augment a ship, it was decided to
reorganize units as "surface reserve divisions.'
Although the reserve divisions drilled and trained
together, each member of the division had an
individual mobilization billet corresponding to
the needs of the fleet. (Murach, 1997, pg. 16)
The Naval Districts ensured that fleet wide
mobilization requirements were met with qualified reservists
in mobilization assignments. In times of mobilization, the
reservists would be processed, issued mobilization orders,
and given government transportation to get to their required
destinations
.
(Murach, 1997, pg. 16)
B. CONSOLIDATION
The Naval Reserve began to reorganize again with the
establishment of the Total Force Policy. In 1973, the ,
21
Commander, Naval Reserve Force (COMNAVRESFOR) established a
new headquarters in New Orleans, Louisiana, as well as a
dual role as Director of Naval Reserve. This new
headquarters consolidated Naval Air Reserve Training Command
from Glenview, Illinois and Naval Surface Reserve Training
Command from Omaha, Nebraska at New Orleans, Louisiana. The
consolidation was important for policy implementation,
resources, and the view of a Total Reserve Force.
Headquartered under COMNAVRESFOR are the Commander, Naval
Air Reserve Force (COMNAVAIRRESFOR) and the Commander, Naval




C. NAVAL SURFACE RESERVE FORCE
In 1976, the Naval District Commandants shifted control
of Surface Reserve Training Centers to a command level
called REDCOMs. Like the old Naval Districts, the REDCOMs
would be in charge of Naval units in their specific
geographic region.
Within this new restructuring, the REDCOM Commander
reported directly to COMNAVSURFRESFOR, and the RESCEN CO
reported to these new regional Commanders. The Reserve Unit
CO still reported to the RESCEN CO.
22
In the early 70' s, the Naval Reserve began a major
effort to align Naval Reserve units with active
force commands. This period of horizontal
integration of reserve units with active
components was an effort to institutionalize the
"One Navy' concept originally envisioned under the
Total Force Concept. COMNAVSURFRESFOR ships were
horizontally integrated into the active fleet for
operational control. For non-hardware or augment
units, this was the beginning of the gaining
command concept presently in place. (Murach, 1997,
pg. 29)
With input from fleet activities, this restructuring
assisted in developing training and mobilization standards
that become a part of the gaining command concept. Due to
the increase in support to the active commands, some
functions are now carried out exclusively by Reservists.
Commands reporting to COMNAVSURFRESFOR include:
REDCOMs, Naval Reserve Force Ships (NRFs) , Mobile
Inshore Undersea Warfare units (MIUW) , Naval
Reserve Cargo Handling Battalions, Naval Reserve
Fleet Hospitals, Special Boat units, and many
other combat and augment related to the needs of
the surface Navy. (Naval Reserve, 1995, pg. 2)
D. NAVAL RESERVE FORCE CHAIN OF COMMAND
The Naval Reserve chain of command consists of six
different levels, called echelons (Figure 3.1).
Echelon I is the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
,
responsible for the organization, administration, training,
and equipping of the Naval Reserve, and for the mobilization
























Figure 3.1: Naval Reserve Chain of Command
The CNO prescribes the programs and units through the
Director, Naval Reserve and coordinates overall plans,
polices, programming, and budget matters. This includes
their location, tables of organization, and mission
statements. (R-07A-0010, 1997, pg. 1-2-2)
Echelon II is COMNAVRESFOR. As the Director, of Naval
Reserve, COMNAVRESFOR supports the CNO in overall planning,
programming and budgeting, including formulation, review,
and presentation of Naval Reserve strength plans, programs,
and budgets. COMNAVRESFOR commands the Naval Reserve Force,
consisting of COMNAVAIRRESFOR, COMNAVSURFRESFOR, and
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Commander, Naval Reserve Recruiting (COMNAVRESCRUITCOM)
.
COMNAVRESFOR maintains training and administration of
Selected Reserves to keep the Naval Reserves in the highest
state of readiness for functions that the CNO may
require. (R-07A-0010, 1997, pg . 1-2-2)
Echelon III is made of many commands. One of them,
COMNAVRESFOR, is the focus of this thesis.
COMNAVSURFRESFOR, manages resources, training,
administration, operational control, and coordination of the
Naval Surface Reserve Force. (R-07A-0010, 1997, pg. 1-2-2)
Echelon IV also consists of many commands, however, the
focus is on the REDCOMs . They are responsible for preparing
and coordinating regional plans for mobilization
execution. (R-07A-0010, 1997, pg. 1-2-4)
Echelon V comprises the Naval Reserve Centers
(NAVRESCEN) and Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Centers
(NAVMARCORRESCEN)
.
(R-07A-0010, 1997, pg . 1-2-5)
Echelon VI consists of the actual Naval Reserve units.
These units are responsible for scheduling, training, and
planning for attached Reserve unit personnel. (R-07A-0010,
1997, pg. 1-2-5)
E. NAVAL SURFACE RESERVE FORCE CHAIN OF COMMAND
The Naval Surface Reserve Force consist of echelons IV,
V and VI commands (Figure 3.2)
.
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NAVAL SURFACE RESERVE FORCE
RESERVE UNIT
Echelon VI
Figure 3.2: Naval Surface Reserve Chain of Command
Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force
(COMNAVSURFRESFOR) exercises overall authority, direction,
operational control, and coordination of Selected Surface
Reserve Programs, including management of all Naval Reserve
resources under COMNAVSURFRESFOR authority. COMNAVSURFRESFOR
manages the effectiveness of resource management, training,
and administration of the Naval Surface Reserve Force. (R-
07A-0010, 1997, pg . 1-2-4)
REDCOMs are responsible for the effective management of
personnel and resources to train, equip, and maintain the
readiness of the inactive Naval Reserve for rapid
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mobilization. They prepare and coordinate regional plans
for mobilization and execute such plans when directed.
Additionally, they serve as COMNAVSURFRESFOR field managers
for assigned facility, equipment and personnel resources and
provide administrative support to all Echelon V commands
assigned to them. (R-07A-0010, 1997, pg. 1-2-5)
The Naval Reserve Readiness Centers (NAVRESREDCENs)
,
Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Readiness Centers
(NAVMARCORRESREDCENs) , and Naval Reserve Centers
(NAVRESCEN) are responsible for scheduling, conducting, and
monitoring training in support of mobilization training
requirements, managing resources, and providing
administrative support to assigned Selected Reservists
.
(R-
07A-0010, 1997, pg . 1-2-5)
Naval Reserve Units responsibilities are contained in
section D above.
F. NAVAL RESERVE READINESS COMMANDS
The Naval Surface Reserve Force currently has ten
Readiness Commands which provide support and oversight to
Reserve Centers throughout the United Sates (Figure 3.3 and
Figure 3.4).
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REDCOM ONE 18 CT, MA, ME, NH, NY, RI
,
VT
REDCOM FOUR 15 DE, PA, NJ, NY, WV
REDCOM SIX 14 MD, NC, VA, WV, WASH DC
REDCOM EIGHT 15 GA, SC, FL, PUERTO RICO
REDCOM NINE 18 AL, AR, LA, MO, MS, TN,
KY,
REDCOM ELEVEN 15 NM, OK, TX
REDCOM THIRTEEN 21 IL, IN, MI, OH,
REDCOM SIXTEEN 23 CO, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO,
ND, NE, SD, WI, WY,
REDCOM NINETEEN 11 CA, HI, NV, AZ
REDCOM TWENTY -TWO 22 AK, CA, ID, MT, NV, OR,
UT, WA,
Figure 3.4: REDCOM' s Areas of Responsibilities
G. REDCOM COMPTROLLER DEPARTMENT
The Comptroller Department is managed by the
Comptroller (N8) . The Comptroller serves as the chief
financial advisor to the Readiness Commander. The
department is responsible for developing the Region's budget
using inputs provided by staff directors and NAVRESCEN
Commanding Officers, and monitoring the execution of the
Region's financial plan within the constraints of the
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policies and procedures mandated by higher authority and the
priorities established by the Readiness Commander.
(COMNAVSURFRESFORINST 5400. 2B, 1996, pg . IX-1)
1. Comptroller Department Organization Chart
The Comptroller Department consists of six personnel
assigned to execute overall budgetary policy guidance
provided by COMNAVRESFOR and COMNAVSURFRESFOR. The
department consists of a Comptroller, Budget Analyst,
Leading Budget Assistant and three Budget Assistants (Figure




















Figure 3.5: Comptroller Department Organization
Structure
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2. Comptroller Department Tasks and Functions
The Comptroller (N8) is the chief financial advisor to
the Readiness Commander and is responsible for:
a. Executing overall budgetary policy guidance.
b. Accountable for properly recording and overseeing
the expenditure of all funds, primarily Operation
and Maintenance, Naval Reserve and Reserve Program
Navy within the Region.
c. Monitors all contracts, leases, and interservice
support agreements to protect the command's
fiduciary interests.




Formulates and submits annual budget and program
objective memorandum inputs to the Readiness
Commander for submission to COMNAVRESFOR and
COMNAVSURFRESFOR
.
g. Oversees personnel in the Comptroller directorate
to ensure that all task are properly conducted.
The Budget Analyst (N81) functions include budget
analysis, including formulation, justification,
presentation, and/or execution of a portion of an
organizations budget. This work requires knowledge and
skill in the application of related laws, regulations,
31
polices, precedents, methods and techniques of budgeting.
(COMNAVSURFRESFORINST 5400. 2B, 1996, pg . IX-1)
Lead Budget Assistant (N82) provides internal control
of allotted operation and maintenance funds and performs a
variety of duties as Lead Budget Assistant in connection
with budgeting, accounting, and maintaining control of
funds. This position leads three GS-4/5 Budget Assistants.
(COMNAVSURFRESFORINST 5400. 2B, 1996, pg . IX- 3)
The three Budget Assistants serve as a source of
budgetary information for a wide variety of appropriated
fund accounts. They provide up-to-date budgetary
information on a wide variety of guidelines and procedures
applicable to appropriated funds. (COMNAVSURFRESFORINST
5400. 2B, 1996, pg . IX-4)
H. SUMMARY
Since the establishment of the Naval Reserves in 1915,
there have been numerous changes to the infrastructure
including the number of Operating Budget holders (REDCOMs)
.
The current alignment of ten Operating Budget holders were
formed in 1996 after the latest rounds of Base Realignment
and Closure (BRAC) completion. With cuts in infrastructure
recommended by the Quadrennial Defense Review, the number of
Operating Budget holders within the Naval Surface Reserve




This chapter discusses the research methods utilized to
determine if the current ten Naval Reserve Readiness
Command's Comptroller Departments (Operating Budget holders)
can be reduced. This thesis research included three areas:
a literature search, a written questionnaire, and
interviews
.
The first method used consisted of archival research.
A literature review was conducted to include prior Naval
Postgraduate School theses, GAO audit reports, DoD Financial
Management Regulations, Quadrennial Defense Review 199 7,
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) reports, Department of
the Navy FY 1997 Budget, financial briefings, and various
other publications. These works laid the foundation for
understanding the various elements associated with reducing
force infrastructure while preserving efficiency and
effectiveness
.
The second method used was a written questionnaire. A
questionnaire was developed and distributed to 50% (five of
ten) comptrollers in COMNAVSURFRESFOR claimancy. The
questionnaire was distributed and completed by comptrollers
from REDCOMs 8, 11, 13, 16, and 22. The questionnaire
provided information on the functions, task requirements,
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task workloads, and structure requirements of REDCOM
comptroller departments. Data from the questionnaire
provided insight into the possible excess capacity within
the comptroller departments.
The third method used was interviews with key.
personnel
.
Interviews were conducted with personnel
assigned to COMNAVRESFOR, COMNAVSURFRESFOR, REDCOM
Comptroller organizations, and Defense Finance and
Accounting Service (DFAS) . These interviews focused on
restructuring /reorganization issues, manpower requirements,
DFAS operating procedures, and comptroller task
requirements. Several telephone interviews were conducted
and generated a deeper understanding of the functions and
procedures within these organizations. Oral interviews were
used to expand the researcher's knowledge base of
comptroller issues in the Naval Reserve. A copy of the
survey is contained in Appendix A.
B. STRENGTHS AND DEFICIENCIES OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
No research method is perfect. In fact it is possible
to critique any research effort. The objective is therefore
to select the best methodology for the circumstances and be





Two of my research techniques, interviews and a
questionnaire, are included in this research category.
a. Advantages
The salient advantage of opinion research is its
ability to capture people's impressions - about themselves,
their environments, and their response to changing
conditions. It is well-known that perceptions differ from
reality, and that a person's beliefs and expectations
influence his own behavior and his attitudes toward behavior
of others. (Buckley, 1976, pg. 35)
Opinion research's strategy is best suited to
futures research, where opinions are substituted for non-
realities. This research method was used because it
provided a high degree of congruence with my research
objective (determine if REDCOM Controller Departments could
be reduced in the future)
.
Jb . Disadvantages
Deficiencies also exist in conducting opinion
research. A major criticism of interviews and
questionnaires is the bias which is introduced in the design
of the survey instruments, i.e., that the researcher defines
the questions, the response sets, decides who will
35
participate, and when and under what conditions they will
participate. (Buckley, 1976, pg. 35)
c. Overcoming the limitations
In designing the interview questions and
questionnaire my goal was to overcome or limit the impact of
the deficiencies discussed above. To maximize the
efficiency and accuracy of the interview and questionnaire,
several strategies were used:
• Establish an interview time/place in advance.
• Develop open-ended questions and send them in
advance of the interview to the interviewee.
• To remove bias in questionnaire development, ask
outside source with no vested interest in the
results to review questions for possible bias
inferences
.
• Random selection of the questionnaire participants
by an outside source.
2 . Archival Research
This research method consisted of original documents
and official files; or data abstracted from these documents
and official files. Archival research was conducted to
gather pertinent information and validate the information
gathered from the opinion research.
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a. Advantages
Archival research is best suited to the analysis
of data in documents, official files, and records. This
method allowed research of historical analysis and provided




By using many of the resources available on
restructuring/reorganization and infrastructure reduction,
this thesis used an informal archival research methodology
to obtain a large quantity of condensed factual information.
There are several problems associated with this type of
informal archival research. Quoting from Research
Methodology & Business Decisions (Buckley, 1976, pg. 45),




• "Filling in the gaps"
• Biases inherent in the researcher, such as
preference for authorities which agree with me.
Even with these potential drawbacks, archival
research carries the advantage of allowing the researcher to
acquire and analyze a significant amount of condensed
information.
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C. DESCRIPTION OF QUESTIONNAIRE
The purpose of the questionnaire was to broaden my
knowledge of the Comptroller Department's functionalites and
collect information on the current and prospective
departmental workloads. The questionnaire (Appendix A) was
distributed and completed by comptrollers from REDCOMs 8,
11, 13, 16, and 22. Appendix A requested information on the
functions, task requirements, task workloads, and structure
requirements of REDCOM comptroller departments. This data
provided insight into the possible excess capacity within
the Comptroller Departments.
1. Task Assignments
COMNAVSURFRESFORINST 5400. 2B delineates task
requirements for completion by financial personnel
assigned to OB holder's Comptroller Departments.
Appendix A contains seven of the most commonly
completed tasks of the Comptroller Department. To
ensure validity, the Comptrollers were each asked to
verify and confirm the seven tasks that were the most
commonly completed by them. The seven tasks include:
• Task 1: Recording and overseeing the expenditure of
all funds, primarily Operations and Maintenance Navy-
Reserve (OMN&R) and Reserve Personnel Navy (RPN)
within the region
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• Task 2: Completing reporting requirements for
executing budgetary policy guidance provided by
COMNAVRESFOR and COMNAVSURFRESFOR
• Task 3: Monitoring contracts, leases, and
interservice support agreements
• Task 4: Conducting financial assessments of records
within the region
• Task 5: Formulating, submitting and revising annual
budgets
• Task 6: Ensuring proper execution of funds
• Task 7: Overseeing personnel in the Comptroller
directorate
2. Financial Personnel Assigned







Figure 4.1: Comptroller Department
3. Questionnaire Completion
The questionnaire was distributed to the Comptrollers
from REDCOMs 8, 11, 13, 16, and 22. They were asked to
complete the % (percent) time consumed by each staff member
on the seven tasks. The percentage of the time consumed in
completing these seven tasks were then converted into the
number of hours per month for data analysis.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter explained the method and logic used in the
preparation of and actual gathering of data. All research
methods have its strengths and deficiencies, however the
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deficiencies in this thesis were minimized by using more
than one methodology to obtain data. Using a balanced
approach of research methods, opinion and archival research,
produced valuable data which will be analyzed and discussed
in the following chapter.
41
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V. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses and presents a series of survey-
questions with analysis and discussion on the responses
offered. The questions were used to assess the opinions of
the REDCOM Comptroller Department's functions, task
requirements, task workloads, and structure requirements.
Data from the questionnaire provided insight into the
possible excess capacity within the Comptroller Departments.
Tasks discussed in the questionnaire are explained in
chapter IV and contained on page 1 of Appendix A. Questions
and data provided by Comptrollers from REDCOMs 8, 11, 13,
16, and 22 are contained in Appendix A.
B. DATA ANALYSIS
1. Question 1: Current Staff Level
What is the current work assignment pattern?
a. Current Work Assignment Pattern (Total)
Figure 5.1 outlines the results of the data
collected from the five REDCOMs. The first chart displays
the percentage of average hours/month/task currently
consumed by the seven tasks. The second chart displays the
current (960 hours available) average hours/month consumed
by each task. The following observations are noted:
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• Task 1 consumes over 55% of total hours/month.
• Tasks 1 and 2 combined consumes 70%, or 668 of 960
available hours/month.
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Figure 5.1: Current Work Assignment Pattern (Total)
Jb. REDCOMs Current Work Assignment Pattern
Figure 5.2 outlines the individual results of each
REDCOM. Each chart displays the percentage of hours/month
(960 hours available) per task currently consumed on the
seven tasks. The following observations are noted:
• Task 1 consumes over 50% of total hours/month for
each REDCOM except REDCOM 11, however, the combined
totals of Task 1 and Task 2 vary little among the
five REDCOMs.
• Tasks 3 and 7 consumes less hours/month to
accomplish than other tasks in all five REDCOMs.
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• REDCOMs 8 and 22 have similar work assignment
patterns while REDCOMs 11, 13 and 16 work patterns
slightly differ.
Figure 5.2: REDCOMs Current Work Assignment Pattern
2. Question 2: One Person Reduction
What is the prospective work assignment pattern when
work hours/month is reduced by 16.7% (one person)?
a. Prospective Work Assignment Pattern (16.7%
Reduction)
Figure 5.3 outlines the results of the data
collected from the five REDCOMs. The first chart displays
the percentage of average hours/month per task consumed on
the seven tasks . The second chart displays the average
hours/month (800 hours available) consumed by each task.
The following observations are noted:
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• Man hours spent in each task declined, however,
major reductions occurred in Task 1.
• Task 1 declined by 125 hours, and the share declined
from 58% to 54%.




Figure 5.3: Prospective Work Assignment Pattern 16.7%
Reduction (Total)
Jb. REDCOMs Prospective Work Assignment Pattern
(16.7% Reduction)
Figure 5.4 outlines the individual results of each
REDCOM. Each chart displays the percentage of hours/month
(800 hours available) per task consumed on the seven tasks.
The following observations are noted:
• Task 1 consumes over 50% of total hours/month for
each REDCOM except REDCOM 11.
• Task 1 hours/month increased from 41% (current) to
43% (16.7% reduction) in REDCOM 11 but decreased in
the remaining four REDCOMs
.
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• REDCOMs 8, 16 and 22 reduced hours/month to complete
Task 3 to zero. This indicate Task 3 becomes a
lower priority task function when reduction occurs.
• Task 3 and 7 consumes less hours/month to accomplish
than the other tasks in all five REDCOMs.
• REDCOMs 8 and 22 have similar work assignment
patterns while REDCOMs 11, 13 and 16 work assignment
patterns slightly differ.
REDCOM 8 {16.7% Reduction) REDCOM 11 (16.7% Reduction) REDCOM 13(16.7% Reduction)
REDCOM 16 (16.7% Reduction) REDCOM 22 (16.7% Reduction)
1«k6 task?
laskS 10% 2%I"" 3%
Figure 5.4: REDCOMs Prospective Work Assignment Pattern
16.7% Reduction
3 . Question 3 : Two Person Reduction
What is the prospective work assignment pattern when
work hours/month is reduced by 33.3% (two personnel)?
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a. Prospective Work Assignment Pattern (33.3%
Reduction)
Figure 5.5 outlines the results of the data
collected from the five REDCOMs . The first chart displays
the percentage of average hours/month per task consumed on
the seven tasks. The second chart displays the reduction
(640 hours available) of average hours/month consumed by
each task. The following observations are noted:
• The general pattern of the reduction is similar to
the one person (16.7%) reduction.
• Specifically, the man-hour consumption has declined
for each task with the biggest reduction occurring
for Task 1.
• Tasks l's man-hour consumption decreased by 75
hours/month. However, its relative share increased
from 54% to 56% in comparison to the previous 16.7%
reduction. This suggests, in contrast to the 16.7%
reduction, increased difficulty in meeting the staff
reductions by a cutback to Task 1 alone.
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b. REDCOMs Prospective Work Assignment Pattern
(33.3% Reduction)
Figure 5.6 outlines the individual results of each
REDCOM. Each chart displays the percentage of hours/month
(640 hours available) per task consumed on the seven tasks.
The following observations are noted:
• Task 1 consumes over 50% of total hours/month for
REDCOMs 8, 13, and 22. This is a high priority task
function.
• Task 1 hours/month increased in REDCOMs 8, 13, and
22. A decrease occurred in Task 1 for REDCOMs 8,
13, and 22 when the work assignment pattern was
reduced from current to 16.7%. This new increase
could be attributed to the department beginning to
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focus available resources on the high priority task
(Task 1)
.
• REDCOMs 8, 16 and 22 reduced hours/month to complete
Task 3 to zero. This indicates Task 3 becomes a
lower priority task function when reduction occurs.
• REDCOMs 8, 13 and 22 have similar work assignment
patterns. REDCOMs 16 and 11 have similar work
assignment patterns.
REDCOM 8 (33.3% Reduction)
tasio Iajk2
REDCOM 11 (33.3% Reduction) REDCOM 13 (333% Reducbon)
REDCOM 16 (33.3% Reducbon) REDCOM 22 (33.3% Reduction)
Figure 5.6: REDCOMs Prospective Work Assignment Pattern
33.3% Reduction
4. Question 4: Three Person Reduction
What is the prospective work assignment pattern when
work hours/month is reduced by 50% (three personnel)?
50
a. Prospective Work Assignment Pattern (50%
Reduction)
Figure 5.7 outlines the results of the data
collected from the five REDCOMs . The first chart displays
the percentage of average hours/month per task consumed on
the seven tasks. The second chart displays the reduction
(480 hours available) of average hours/month consumed by
each task. The following observations are noted:
• In contrast to earlier reductions, most of the
reductions now come from tasks other than Task 1.
This suggests both the importance of Task 1 activity
to the REDCOM, and the realization of the minimum
required staffing level.
• Task 1 is reduced by 11 hours/month, while the
combined reductions from other tasks amount to 149
hours/month.
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Figure 5.7: Prospective Work Assignment Pattern 50 !
Reduction (Total)
b. REDCOMs Prospective Work Assignment Pattern
(50% Reduction)
Figure 5.8 outlines the individual results of each
REDCOM. Each chart displays the percentage of hours/month
(480 hours available) per task consumed on the seven tasks.
The following observations are noted:
• Task 1 consumes over 55% of total hours/month for
all REDCOMs. This indicates Task 1 is a high
priority task function.
• Task 1 hours/month increased in all REDCOMs. This
increase is attributed to the department focusing
available resources on the high priority task (task
1) .
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• REDCOMs 8, 16 and 22 reduced hours/month to complete
Task 3 to zero. This indicates Task 3 becomes a
lower priority task function when reduction occurs.
• When a 50% reduction occurs, low priority is placed
on completing all tasks except Task 1. This data
indicates that the REDCOMs are neglecting the other
tasks to accomplish Task 1. The REDCOMs have
difficulty remaining efficient and effective when a
50% reduction occurs.
• REDCOMs 8, 13, 16 and 22 have similar work
assignment patterns.
REOCOM 8 (50% Reduction) REDCOM 11 (50% Reduction)
taskS
17%








REDCOM 16 (50% Reduction) REDCOM 22 (50% Reduction)
Figure 5 .
8
REDCOMs Prospective Work Assignment Pattern 50%
Reduction
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5. Question 5, 6 and 7: Additional Reserve Centers
What is the prospective work assignment pattern if
five, ten or fifteen additional Reserve Centers are added to
your region (can be greater than 100% and can add additional
personnel)
?
The objective of this question was to examine how
additional Reserve Centers affected the efficiency and
effectiveness of the Comptroller Departments. The analysis
in this area will be used to corroborate and compare the
findings of the personnel reductions. Additionally, the
questions provided insight into the possible excess capacity
within the Comptroller Departments.
Each REDCOM's existing staff level includes six
personnel. Each person works 40 hours per week. Therefore,
the total monthly hours per REDCOM is 960 hours. A combined
total of 4800 hours is available for all five REDCOMs
together (960*5). Figure 5.9 displays the results when
five, ten and fifteen Reserve Centers are added to each
REDCOM.
a. Five Additional Reserve Centers
The questionnaire responses and subsequent data
analysis concluded that all REDCOMs could add five
additional Reserve Centers without changing the current
staffing levels.
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b. Ten Additional Reserve Centers
Data analysis, based upon the same questionnaire
results, indicates that a total of 5480 hours were required
to complete the tasks efficiently and effectively. The 5480
hours resulted in a 680 hour increase over the original
hours available (4800). The 680 hour increase distributed
to the five REDCOMs equal to 13 6 additional hours/month per
REDCOM. Figure 5.9 shows the requirement for almost one
(.85) additional staff member necessary to maintain
efficiency and effectiveness.
c. Fifteen Additional Reserve Centers
Data analysis, based upon the same questionnaire
results, indicates that a total of 5880 hours were required
to complete the tasks efficiently and effectively. The 5880
hours resulted in a 1080 hour increase over the original
hours available (4800) . The 1080 hours increase distributed
to the five REDCOMs equal to 216 additional hours/month per
REDCOM. Figure 5.9 shows the requirement for slightly more
than one (1.35) additional staff member necessary to
maintain efficiency and effectiveness.
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Figure 5.9: Total Hours Used For Additional Reserve Centers
6. Question 8: Billet Elimination
Which billet would you eliminate if you had to reduce
staff manning levels to five personnel?
Readiness Command (REDCOM) Billet Assignment
REDCOM 8 BUDGET ASSISTANT (GS 5)
REDCOM 11 BUDGET ASSISTANT (GS 5)
REDCOM 13 BUDGET ASSISTANT (GS 5)
REDCOM 16 BUDGET ASSISTANT (GS 5)
REDCOM 22 BUDGET ASSISTANT (GS 5)
Figure 5.10: Billet Elimination
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7. Question 9: Geographic Location
Does geographical location affect financial oversight
of subordinate Reserve Centers?






Figure 5.11: Geographic Location
8. Question 10: Reserve Center Size
Does the size of subordinate Reserve Centers increase
your departments workload?






Figure 5.12: Reserve Center Size
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9. Question 11: Maximum Number Reserve Centers
What is the maximum number of Reserve Centers that can
effectively and efficiently managed by your Comptroller
Department?
35
D Projected Number Reserve Centers

































Figure 5.13: Maximum Number of Reserve Centers that Can Be
Effectively Managed
REDCOMs 8 and 11 have the least number of Reserve
Centers to manage. REDCOMs 13, 16, and 22 have the largest
amount Reserve Centers to manage. Although both REDCOMs (8
and 11) manage the same number of Reserve Centers, their
responses to the maximum number of Reserve Centers were
different. REDCOM 8 had an optimistic response while REDCOM
11 had a pessimistic response. The three REDCOMs with the
largest number of Reserve Centers responded similarly.
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10. Question 12: OB Holder Reduction
Do you feel the Operating Budget holders can be reduced
and continue to perform functions efficiently and
effectively?






Figure 5.14: OB Holders Reduction
C. COST VARIABLES
1. Operations and Maintenance Naval Reserve (O&MNR)
Budget Allotments
O&MNR allotment is decentralized to the REDCOMs as the
OB holders. Reserve Personnel Navy (RPN) allotment is
centralized and is controlled at the RESFOR level. The
O&MNR allotment provides funds for the day to day operations
and maintenance of Naval Reserve Forces. Accounts within
this allotment include fuel, supplies, contracts for
maintenance of equipment and facilities, civilian personnel
salaries and benefits, contract berthing, Temporary
Additional Duty (TAD) , and weapons and equipment repair
parts. (R-07A-0010, 1997, pg. 4-2-4)
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2. The DFAS FEE
In order to have the O&MNR allotment decentralized to
the REDCOMs, the Reserves incur a cost. DFAS charges RESFOR
a billing fee for overhead to distribute this allotment to
various lower level OB holders. COMNAVSURFRESFOR OB holders
are the ten REDCOMs
.
The following is a break down of the formula used in
figuring the total cost charged to RESFOR for having the
O&MNR allotment lowered to the REDCOM level:
(# of Subheads)* (# of Months) * (# of Years) * (Billing Rate) =
DFAS Fee
• Subhead - One subhead per REDCOM OB holders (10 total)
• Months - 12 months for the year.
• Years - Six active years = Calendar Year plus five previous
years
.
• Billing Rate - The DFAS billing rate is $2475 dollars.
10*12*6*2475 = 1,782,000
The 1,782,000 dollars is the fee that RESFOR must pay
DFAS each year in order to have the O&MNR allotment
decentralized to the ten REDCOM OB holders. The fee goes up
as the billing rate increases each year or the number of OB
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holders or the billing rate must decrease. (Murach, 1997,
pg. 31)
3. Staff Salaries
The Comptroller Department consists of six personnel
assigned to execute overall budgetary policy guidance
provided by COMNAVRESFOR and COMNAVSURFRESFOR. The
department consists of a Comptroller, Budget Analyst,
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Figure 5.15: Comptroller Department
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For purposes of this analysis, salaries (steps) for each
grade will remain fixed at mid range (step 5) and does not
include locality pay (regional) adjustments. In addition to
their salaries, the civilian personnel receive fringe
benefits. For purposes of analysis fringe benefits were
costed at 20% of the base salary. The following salaries
and benefits are contained in Figure 5.16.
Grade Salary Benefits Salaries + Benefits
GS-12 (step 5) $50,948 $10,190 $61,138
GS-9 (step 5) $35,133 $7, 027 $42, 160
GS-7 (step 5) $28,720 $5,744 $34,464
GS-5 (step 5) $22,188 $4,438 $26, 626
GS-5 (step 5) $22,188 $4,438 $26,626
GS-5 (step 5) $22,188 $4,438 $26,626
Total Salaries and Benefits : $217,640
Figure 5.16: Salaries and Benefits
4 . Average Number Reserve Centers
Figure 5.17 contain the total number of REDCOMs and
Reserve Centers in COMNAVSURFRESFOR claimancy. For purpose
of this analysis, an average of 17 Reserve Centers per
REDCOM was computed:
172 Reserve Centers = 17.2 (rounded down) = 17
10 REDCOMs
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REDCOM TWENTY -TWO 22
Total Reserve Centers 172
Figure 5.17: Number REDCOMs and Reserve Centers
5. Excess Capacity
Data from the questionnaire provided insight into the
excess capacity within the Comptroller Departments. This
section will discuss the process for determining the excess
capacity within the departments. The outcome of this data
analysis will form the framework for answering the primary
and secondary questions of the thesis.
To illustrate the excess capacity workload of staff
personnel an analysis was conducted on the monthly workloads
of the Comptroller, Budget Analyst, and Lead Budget
Assistant. This analysis included computing the average
(mean) number hours/month, standard deviation, and
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coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by
mean) for the seven task. The coefficient of variation is
a measure of relative dispersion and is used to compare
dispersion of data that is in different units. A lower
coefficient of variation is more desirable than a higher
coefficient of variation.
a. Comptroller Workload
Figure 5.18 shows the Comptroller's workload
distribution for the current structure, 16.7% reduction,
33.3% reduction and 50% reduction. The workload
distribution levels for the current, 16.7% and 33.3%
reduction are similar. However, when a 33.3% reduction
occurs a significant increase occurs in Task 1. The
distribution workload changes dramatically and a drastic
increase in Task 1 occurred when a 50% reduction occurs from
the current structure.
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Figure 5.18: Comptroller Workload
b. Budget Analyst Workload
Figure 5.19 shows the Budget Analyst workload
distribution for the current structure, 16.7% reduction,
33.3% reduction and 50% reduction. The workload
distribution levels for the current, 16.7% and 33.3%
reduction are similar. However, when a 33.3% reduction
occurs a significant increase occurs in Task 1. The
distribution workload changes dramatically and a drastic
increase in Task 1 occurred when a 50% reduction occurs from
the current structure.
65







Budget Analyst (33.3% Reduction)
I AVG
iStd Dev
- Coeff of Var
Task Number
Budget Analyst (Current) Budget Analyst (16.7% Reduction)
EEZSAVG
MM StdDev







Task Number Task Number
Figure 5.19: Budget Analyst
c. Lead Budget Assistant Workload
Figure 5.20 shows the Lead Budget Assistant
workload distribution for the current structure, 16.7%
reduction, 33.3% reduction and 50% reduction. The workload
distribution levels for the current, 16.7% and 33.3%
reduction are also similar. However, when a 33.3% reduction
occurs a significant increase occurs in Task 1. The
distribution workload changes dramatically and a drastic
increase in Task 1 occurred when a 50% reduction occurs from
the current structure.
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Figure 5.20: Lead Budget Assistant Workload
d. Workload Interpretation
The data for all three staff billets indicate
excess capacity exists in the current structure and enough
excess capacity exists to maintain effectiveness and
efficiency if a one person reduction occurs. Effectiveness




Since the workload levels for the above three
billets remained stable or constant when a one person
reduction occurs, the additional workload distribution must
be shifting between the three Budget Assistants. Therefore,
for purposes of this analysis, the Comptroller, Budget
Analyst, Lead Budget Assistant can be considered fixed
billets and the Budget Assistants can be considered variable
billets
.
Enough excess capacity exists to absorb the
workload when a one person reduction occurs. The three
fixed billets and two variable billets (Budget Assistants)
can maintain effectiveness and efficiency. Results of the
data previously discussed in this chapter can be used to
determine the number of Reserve Centers that can be
effectively and efficiently managed. The following steps
will be used to determine the number of Reserve Centers that
can be effectively and efficiently managed:
• 172 Reserve Centers (Figure 5.17)
• Average of 17 Reserve Centers per REDCOM (PARA C.4)
• Due to excess capacity, five personnel (three fixed
and two variable) can effectively and efficiently
manage the current number Reserve Centers (172)
• Number Reserve Centers divided by variable billets
equal number of Reserve Centers per billet
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• 17 Reserve Centers divided by two variable billets
equals 9 (8.5 round up) Reserve Centers per billet
• Therefore, the total number of Reserve Centers for
three variable billets is equal to 26 Reserve
Centers (17 plus 9)
Therefore, if the current Comptroller Department's
workload was operating at full capacity, 26 Reserve Centers
could be effectively and efficiently managed.
D. SUMMARY
The data presented confirmed that excess capacity exist
within the Comptroller Department. Conclusions,
recommendations and answering questions to the thesis
research will be discussed in the following chapter. The
foundation or framework for answering the thesis questions
will be based on the premise that 26 Reserve Centers could




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The research questions provided in chapter one will
form the basis for the thesis conclusions, recommendations
and research for further study. Questionnaire responses and
results of data analysis will be discussed in addressing the
primary and secondary research questions. Following this
presentation, recommendations and areas for further research
will be provided regarding the reduction of OB holders in
COMNAVSURFRESFOR
.
Chapter I presented the following primary question:
What is the best structure of Naval Surface Reserve Force
Operating Budget holders (comptroller organizations) while
preserving efficiency and effectiveness of financial
operations? Prior to answering the primary question, each
secondary question will be addressed.
A. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Question 1:
Can the number of Naval Surface Reserve Force Operating
Budget holders (comptroller organizations) be reduced while




Yes. Excess capacity exists in the Comptroller
Departments. The existence of excessive capacity can be
corroborated by comparing answers provided directly from the
Comptrollers (via the questionnaire) and results from the
analysis of the workload capacity of the departments.
Eighty percent of the five Comptrollers questioned
responded that OB holders could be reduced without losing
efficiency and effectiveness (CH V, PARA B.10, question 12)
.
The results of the data analysis corroborates this opinion
of the Comptrollers.
Analysis presented in the previous chapter shows
that each OB holder has enough capacity to add at least nine
more Reserve Centers. Therefore, the number of OB holders
can be reduced from ten and still maintain its effectiveness
and efficiency.
b. Recommendation
The data presented clearly show that OB holders
can be reduced and remain effective and efficient.
COMNAVSURFRESFOR should initiate procedures to reduce OB
holders
.
2 . Question 2 :
What is the cost savings of reducing Operating Budget
holder's comptroller organizations?
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a - Concl usion
The primary question provided two alternatives to
reducing the number of OB holders (PARA B.l) . This thesis
will only address personnel and DFAS cost savings.
Current Staffing Levels . Naval Surface Reserve
Force Operating Budget holders (comptroller organizations)
could be reduced from ten to seven and continue to operate
efficiently and effectively. The cost savings are as
follow:
• DFAS Fee (CH 5, PARA C.2) :
$178,200 per REDCOM OB holders
• Personnel Salaries/Benefits (Figure 5.16):
$217,640 per REDCOM OB holders
• Cost Savings:
DFAS - $178,200*3 = $534,600
Personnel - $217,640*3 = $652,920
Total Savings = $1,187,520
One Additional GS-5 . Naval Surface Reserve Force
Operating Budget holders (comptroller organizations) could
be reduced from ten to five (addition of one GS-5 Budget
Assistant) and continue to operate efficiently and
effectively. The cost savings are as follow:
• DFAS Fee (CH 5, PARA C.2)
:
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$178,200 per REDCOM OB holders
• Personnel Salaries/Benefits (Figure 5.16):
$217,640 per REDCOM OB holders
$26,626 per GS-5 (Budget Assistant)
• Cost Savings:
DFAS - $178,200*5 = $891,000
Personnel - $217,640*5 = $1,088,200
GS-5 - $26,626*5 = $133,130
Total Savings (DFAS + Personnel - GS-5) = $1,846,070
b. Recommendation
Initiate OB holder reductions to realize cost
savings
.
3 . Question 3 :
What is the best way to consolidate Operating Budget
holder's comptroller organizations?
a. Conclusion
The survey results suggest that geographical
location of subordinate Reserve Centers had no affect on
financial oversight. Additionally, the size of subordinate
Reserve Centers had no affect on the departments' workload.
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b. Recommendation
Location and size have no affect on financial
oversight by the REDCOMs
. COMNAVSURFRESFOR should conduct a
study to determine other variables, outside of this thesis,
that would influence the consolidation of Reserve Centers
under a particular Operating Budget holder.
4. Question 4:
How many Reserve Centers can an Operating Budget
holder's comptroller organization manage efficiently and
effectively?
a . Conclusion
With current staff levels, capacity exists for an
additional nine Reserve Centers per REDCOM. The addition of
one GS-5 will allow for capacity to manage an additional
eighteen Reserve Centers.
The Comptrollers' direct responses from the
questionnaire conveyed their opinion that the number of
Reserve Centers that could be effectively and efficiently
managed ranged from 27-35. The average number was 3
Reserve Centers. With an average of 3 Reserve Centers and
a baseline of 17 Reserve Centers per REDCOM, the
Comptrollers' believed that their departments could manage
an additional 13 Reserve Centers. However, the data
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analysis concluded that an additional 9 Reserve Centers
could be added to each REDCOM.
A four Reserve Center difference exists. The
conservative approach will be used to conclude that each
REDCOM could consume nine additional Reserve Centers.
b . Recommenda tion
COMNAVSURFRESFOR should use a baseline of nine
additional Reserve Centers when calculating the optimal
number of additional Reserve Centers an Operating Budget
holder's comptroller organization can manage efficiently and
effectively.
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Question 1:
What is the best structure of Naval Surface Reserve
Force Operating Budget holders (comptroller organizations)
while preserving efficiency and effectiveness of financial
operations?
a. Conclusion
Current Staffing Levels . Naval Surface Reserve
Force Operating Budget holders (comptroller organizations)
could be reduced from ten to seven and continue to operate
efficiently and effectively. A baseline of 26 Reserve
Centers per REDCOM was concluded from data analysis. A
total of 172 Reserve Centers exist in COMNAVSURFRESFOR. This
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computes to seven (6.6 rounded up) REDCOMs required to
manage 172 Reserve Centers.
One Additional GS-5 . Naval Surface Reserve Force
Operating Budget holders (comptroller organizations) could
be reduced from ten to five (addition of one GS-5 Budget
Assistant) and continue to operate efficiently and
effectively. The addition of one GS-5 would change the
capacity of REDCOMs to manage 18 additional Reserve Centers
vice 9 additional Reserve Centers. A baseline of 35 Reserve
would exist. This computes to five (4.9 rounded up) REDCOMs
required to manage 172 Reserve Centers. Figure 5.9
corroborates this finding.
b. Update (additional closings)
Subsequent to the start of this thesis,
COMNAVSURFRESFOR initiated closure or completed closure of
13 Reserve Centers. A total of 159 Reserve Centers will be
operational by the end of FY 1998. (Turnley, 01 Dec 97) A
baseline total of 159 vice 172 Reserve Centers in
COMNAVSURFRESFOR would result in six (6.1 rounded down)
REDCOMs required to manage 159 Reserve Centers at the
current staffing level. At a baseline total of 159 vice 172
Reserve Centers and the addition of one GS-5 would result in
between four and five (4.5) REDCOMs required to manage 159
Reserve Centers.
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c . Recommenda. tion
COMNAVSURFRESFOR should initiate procedures to
reduce OB holders.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
There have been several aspects of this thesis that
warrant additional research. The scope of this thesis was
limited to analyzing current operations and current excess
capacity within Operating Budget holders comptroller
organizations. Recommend additional research be conducted
on the reduction of oversight at Naval Reserve Readiness
Commands by eliminating support positions no longer required
because of improvements in communications and information
technology. Secondly, recommend additional studies be
conducted on new methods and processes to improve operating
procedures (process reengineering) . These initiatives could
produce further savings within the Naval Reserve Force.
D. SUMMARY
This thesis set out to examine whether enough excess
capacity exists in COMNAVSURFRESFOR OB holder's (comptroller
departments) to reduce from a current level of ten. The
findings illustrate that excess capacity does exist.
COMNAVSURFRESFOR is internally reviewing its' infrastructure
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to see where savings can be generated. These findings will
assist COMNAVSURFRESFOR in meeting those cost saving goals.
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APPENDIX A. COMPTROLLER QUESTIONNAIRE
COMNAVSURFRESFORINST 5400.2B provides guidance and basic functions of the Comptroller
Departments under its claimancy. The Comptroller Department is responsible for developing the
Naval Reserve Readiness Command Region's budget using inputs provided by staff directors and
Naval Reserve Center Commanding Officers, and monitoring the execution of the Region's financial
plan.
The data requested below will assist me in creating a database for my thesis research. The tables
below consist of tasks 1-7 and personnel assignments A-F. Tasks, personnel assignments, and
information for tables 1-3 are as follow:
Task
Recording and overseeing the expenditure of all funds, primarily OMN&R and RPN
within the region.
Reporting requirements.
Monitoring of contracts, leases, and interservice support agreements.
Conducting financial assessments of records within the region.
Formulating, submitting and revising annual budgets.
Ensuring proper execution of funds.
Overseeing personnel in the Comptroller directorate.
Financial Personnel Assigned
A Comptroller (GS 12)
B Budget Analysis (GS 9)
C Leading Budget Assistant (GS 6/7)
D Budget Assistant (GS 4/5)
E Budget Assistant (GS 4/5)
F Budget Assistant (GS 4/5)
REDCOMs 8, 11, 13, 16, 22 (Please Enter % In The Cells)
Table A Current Work Assignment Pattern (percentage)
PERSONNEL









Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Available Total Work Hours = 960 hrs/month
Table B Prospective Work Assignment Pattern (percentage) when work hour/month
is reduced by (16.7%). i.e. New total workhours available is 800 hrs/month.
PERSONNEL








Total 1 00% 100% 100% 1 00% 100% 1 00%
Current Total Work Hours =
Original Available Total Work Hours =
800 hrs/month
960 hrs/month
Table C Prospective Work Assignment Pattern (percentage) when work hour/month
is reduced by (33.3%), i.e. New total workhours available is 640 hrs/month.
PERSONNEL








Total 1 00% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Current Total Work Hours = 640 hrs/month
Original Available Total Work Hours = 960 hrs/month
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Table D Prospective Work Assignment Pattern (percentage) when work hour/month
is reduced by (50%), i.e. New total workhours available is 480 hrs/month.
Total
PERSONNEL








100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 1 00%
Current Total Work Hours = 480 hrs/month
Original Available Total Work Hours = 960 hrs/month
Table E Prospective Work Assignment Pattern (percentage) if five additional
Reserve Centers are added to your region (can be greater than 100% & can add additional
personnel).
PERSONNEL









Table F Prospective Work Assignment Pattern (percentage) if ten additional













Table G Prospective Work Assignment Pattern (percentage) if fifteen additional
Reserve Centers are added to your region (can be greater than 100% & can add additional
personnel).
PERSONNEL












Which billet would you eliminate if you had cut back to five financial personnel?
2. Does geographical location affect financial oversight of subordinate Reserve Centers?
3. Does the size of subordinate Reserve Centers increase your department's workload?
4. What is the maximum number of Reserve Centers that can be effectively and efficiently managed
by your Comptroller Department?
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